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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 
 
Richard King )    Docket No.  2016-07-0378 
 ) 
v. )    State File No. 35498-2015 
 ) 
Big Binder Express, LLC, et al. ) 
 ) 
 ) 
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) 
Compensation Claims ) 
Allen Phillips, Judge ) 
 
  
Reversed and Remanded - Filed December 7, 2016 
 
 
The employee in this interlocutory appeal suffered work-related injuries to his head, face, 
and vision when a crank handle struck him in the face.  The employer accepted the claim 
as compensable and provided medical and temporary disability benefits.  The employee’s 
authorized ophthalmologist assigned a permanent impairment rating to the employee’s 
vision but indicated that it was “skewed” because underlying test results were “unreliable 
and inconsistent.”  Thereafter, the employer sought a medical examination of the 
employee pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(1).  The trial court 
ruled that the employer’s request to have the employee examined was unreasonable 
because the employee’s ophthalmologist was an authorized physician and the employer 
was merely seeking another impairment rating.  Accordingly, the trial court refused to 
order the employee to submit to the examination.  The employer has appealed.  We 
reverse the trial court’s decision and remand the case. 
 
Presiding Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in 
which Judge David F. Hensley and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined. 
 
Michael W. Jones, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Big Binder Express, 
LLC 
 
Jay DeGroot, Jackson, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Richard King 
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Factual and Procedural Background 
    
 On March 24, 2015, Richard King (“Employee”), a truck driver, suffered injuries 
arising out of and occurring in the course and scope of his employment with Big Binder 
Express, LLC (“Employer”).  On that date, a crank handle, described in the record as a 
steel pipe with a handle on the end, struck him in the face with “extreme force” and 
knocked him unconscious for several minutes.  Among other problems, Employee 
suffered a broken nose, headaches, memory loss, and blurred vision.  Employer accepted 
the claim as compensable and provided medical and temporary disability benefits. 
 
Employee was treated by an optometrist, an ENT, a neurologist, and an 
ophthalmologist.  As pertinent to this appeal, Employee’s authorized ophthalmologist, 
Dr. Jason Sullivan, assigned a permanent impairment rating of 34% to Employee’s vision 
and placed him at maximum medical recovery.  However, Dr. Sullivan wrote on the 
impairment evaluation form next to his impairment rating that “these results are skewed 
because of the unreliable and inconsistent results of the peripheral vision testing.” 
 
 Employee was also examined by Dr. Samuel Chung, a neurologist, for the purpose 
of providing an impairment rating for various conditions associated with Employee’s 
head injuries.  Dr. Chung, who evaluated Employee at his request, provided impairment 
ratings totaling 13% to the body as a whole, but he did not provide an impairment rating 
for Employee’s vision.  Dr. Chung stated he would “defer the specific impairment rating 
for the eyes to the ophthalmologist,” Dr. Sullivan. 
 
 Thereafter, Employer sought an opinion regarding the impairment to Employee’s 
vision from the Medical Impairment Rating Registry (“MIRR Program”).1  Employee 
objected and, because there were no competing ratings pertaining to Employee’s vision 
impairment, the MIRR Program declined to perform an evaluation.  Employer then 
scheduled a medical examination regarding Employee’s vision pursuant to Tennessee 
Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(1).  Employee refused to attend the appointment, 
prompting Employer to file a petition for benefit determination. 
 
 The trial court concluded that Employer’s request to have Employee examined 
was unreasonable because Dr. Sullivan was an authorized physician and Employer 
merely sought another medical impairment rating.  The trial court explained that it could 
find “nothing reasonable about requesting another opinion when [Employer’s] approved 
                                                 
1 The MIRR Program may be invoked when “a dispute as to the degree of medical impairment exists” and 
establishes a mechanism for a neutral physician to evaluate the injured worker and assess an impairment 
rating, which is presumed accurate, although that presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(d)(5) (2015).  Such a dispute exists when, among other things, 
“[a]t least two different physicians have issued differing permanent medical impairment ratings . . . and 
the parties disagree as to those impairment ratings.”  Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-20-.01(7) (2015). 
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physician performed the testing.”  Accordingly, the trial court declined to order 
Employee to attend the examination Employer had scheduled.  Employer has appealed. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision is statutorily mandated 
and limited in scope.  Specifically, “[t]here shall be a presumption that the findings and 
conclusions of the workers’ compensation judge are correct, unless the preponderance of 
the evidence is otherwise.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2015).  The trial court’s 
decision may be reversed or modified if the rights of a party “have been prejudiced 
because findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of a workers’ compensation judge: 
 
(A) Violate constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(B) Exceed the statutory authority of the workers’ compensation judge; 
(C) Do not comply with lawful procedure; 
(D) Are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, or 
clearly an unwarranted exercise of discretion; or 
(E) Are not supported by evidence that is both substantial and material 
in the light of the entire record.”  
 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(3) (2015). 
 
A trial court’s decision to grant or deny an employer’s request for a medical 
examination pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(1) is reviewed 
on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard.  Overstreet v. TRW Commer. Steering 
Div., 256 S.W.3d 626, 639 (Tenn. 2008).  This standard prohibits an appellate court from 
substituting its judgment for that of the trial court, and the appellate court will find an 
abuse of discretion only if the trial court “applied incorrect legal standards, reached an 
illogical conclusion, based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, 
or employ[ed] reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.”  Wright ex 
rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tenn. 2011).  That said, discretionary 
decisions “require a conscientious judgment, consistent with the facts, that takes into 
account the applicable law.”  White v. Beeks, 469 S.W.3d 517, 527 (Tenn. 2015). 
 
Analysis 
 
A. 
 
 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Employer’s 
request to have Employee examined pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
204(d)(1).  Employer contends that its request was reasonable given that the authorized 
treating ophthalmologist, Dr. Sullivan, made clear that his impairment rating was 
uncertain because it was based on unreliable test results.  Employee responds that 
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Employer seeks only to obtain a lower impairment rating and, therefore, Employer’s 
request is per se unreasonable.  For the reasons that follow, we find that Employer is 
entitled to the requested medical examination. 
 
 The pertinent statute, section 50-6-204(d)(1), provides that the “injured employee 
must submit to examination by the employer’s physician at all reasonable times if 
requested to do so by the employer.”  (Emphasis added.)  Moreover, when a party’s 
physical or mental condition is at issue, “the court in which the action is pending may 
order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or 
certified examiner . . . upon motion for good cause shown . . . .”  Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35.01.2 
 
An employer’s right to have an employee examined by a physician of its choice 
has been a frequently disputed issue in workers’ compensation cases for decades.  As far 
back as 1947, for example, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the issue when an 
employer requested an employee be required to attend an examination on the theory that 
the employee’s problems were due to syphilis rather than a work-related back injury.  
Trent v. American Serv. Co., 206 S.W.2d 301 (Tenn. 1947).  The trial court ruled the 
employer was entitled to the examination, which would involve the extraction of spinal 
fluid.  Id. at 302.  The Supreme Court affirmed, finding withdrawing spinal fluid to be 
akin to drawing blood and that the requested examination was “entirely reasonable.”  Id. 
at 304.  In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court observed that the statute allowing 
an employer to request a medical examination, now section 50-6-204(d)(1), was designed 
to provide “the employer a fair means of ascertaining if and when the employee has 
entirely recovered from the injury for which the employer is paying compensation or of 
ascertaining whether the ailments from which the employee suffers at some period 
subsequent to the injury is [sic] due to that injury or to some other cause not connected 
with his or her employment.”  Id. at 303. 
 
Years later, in Stubblefield v. Hot Mix Paving Co., 383 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. 1964), 
the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s order requiring an injured worker to attend an 
examination that necessitated travelling some distance.  The Court held that 
 
[t]he employer has a right to have the employee examined by a doctor or a 
physician of [the employer’s] choosing so long as [the employer] . . . pays 
the expense of the employee . . . for the very obvious reason of having [the 
employer’s] own physician determine whether or not he thinks the 
employee is injured as he claims.  This then provides the evidence pro and 
con on behalf of the employee and employer for the trier of facts to weigh 
and reach his determination. 
                                                 
2 “[T]he Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern proceedings at all hearings before a workers’ 
compensation judge unless an alternate procedural or evidentiary rule has been adopted by the 
administrator.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(1) (2015); Syph v. Choice Food Grp., Inc., No. 2015-06-
0288, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Apr. 21, 2016). 
5 
 
Id. at 47.  Thus, the rule has developed that “physical examinations requested pursuant to 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(1) generally should be granted.”  Perry 
v. Gap, Inc., No. M2004-02525-WC-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 448, at *7 (Tenn. 
Workers’ Comp. Panel May 31, 2006). 
 
However, an employer’s right to an examination of an employee pursuant to 
section 50-6-204(d)(1) by a physician of the employer’s choosing is not without limits.  
In particular, both by statute and case law, the employer’s request must be reasonable.  In 
Overstreet
3
 for example, the employer, citing section 50-6-204(d)(1) and Tennessee Rule 
of Civil Procedure 35.01, argued that the trial court erred in refusing to grant its request 
for an examination of an employee.  The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed, holding that 
an employer is entitled to an examination by a physician of its choosing “so long as the 
request is reasonable.”  Id.  The Court explained that 
 
an employer has a statutory right to compel an injured employee to undergo 
a medical evaluation by a physician of the employer’s choosing.  The 
employee may challenge the request as unreasonable in light of the 
circumstances.  If the trial court determines the request is reasonable, the 
employee must submit to a medical evaluation conducted by the physician 
of the employer’s choice.  Any failure on the part of the employee to 
comply with such an order may result in a dismissal of the workers’ 
compensation claim.  If the employer’s request is unreasonable, the trial 
court should deny the request, but must specifically state its reasons in the 
record. 
 
Id. at 639 (citations omitted). 
 
To assist trial courts in determining whether an employer’s request is reasonable, 
the Supreme Court has indicated courts should be mindful of whether the proposed 
examination will subject the worker to “appreciable pain or suffering or danger to life or 
health.”  Id. at 637.  In addition, the Court has observed that its decisions regarding 
employer-requested examinations “should not be interpreted to stand for the proposition 
that a reasonable request by an employer for a medical evaluation of the employee is 
satisfied by an evaluation conducted by the employee’s treating physician.”  Id. at 639. 
 
In short, the only limitations placed on the employer’s right to require the 
employee to submit to an examination by a physician of the employer’s choosing is that 
the employer’s request be made at a “reasonable time[],” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
204(d)(1), and “be reasonable, as a whole, in light of the surrounding circumstances,” 
                                                 
3Overstreet affirmed the principle established in Trent that an employer is entitled to have an employee 
examined if reasonably necessary to evaluate a claim, but has been abrogated on other grounds.  See 
Hayes v. Am. Zurich Ins. Co., No. E2010-00099-WC-R3-WC, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 458, at *16 n.3 (Tenn. 
Workers’ Comp. Panel May 25, 2011). 
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Overstreet, 256 S.W.3d at 637 n.4.  Subject to these limitations, “if an employer’s request 
for such an examination is reasonable, . . . the trial court is obligated to grant it.”  Irons v. 
K & K Trucking, Inc., No. M2010-01280-WC-R3-WC, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 614, at *9 
(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel July 14, 2011).  Reasonableness in “each case must be 
determined upon all the particular facts of that particular case.”  Trent, 206 S.W.2d at 
304. 
 
B. 
 
 Guided by the foregoing principles, we turn to the circumstances of this case.  The 
trial court found Employer’s request was unreasonable because the physician who 
assigned the impairment rating to Employee’s vision, Dr. Sullivan, was an authorized 
treating physician.  While Dr. Sullivan’s status as an authorized physician may be a factor 
to consider in determining whether the request for an examination is reasonable, it is not 
the sole determinative factor.
4
  In Overstreet, as here, the employee’s treating physician 
was authorized by the employer.  However, the Supreme Court in Overstreet observed 
that a request for an employer’s medical examination is not satisfied merely because the 
employee was examined by his or her authorized physician.  Id. at 639.  Implicit in the 
Court’s observation is the conclusion that an authorized physician is not the functional 
equivalent of a physician of the employer’s choosing for purposes of section 50-6-
204(d)(1).
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Moreover, if we were to accept Employee’s position that an employer’s 
examination request made pursuant to section 50-6-204(d)(1) is per se improper when the 
disputed opinion comes from an authorized physician, the reasonableness standard 
embodied in the statute and applied by the courts would be reduced to a single 
consideration.  This we decline to do.  Instead, all relevant circumstances should be taken 
into account when assessing the reasonableness of a request made pursuant to section 50-
6-204(d)(1).  As stated by the Supreme Court, reasonableness in “each case must be 
determined upon all the particular facts of that particular case.”  Trent, 206 S.W.2d at 
304.  Thus, the reasonableness of an employer’s request must be examined in light of all 
the surrounding circumstances, and when an employer has sufficient reason to question 
the opinion of an authorized physician, it may do so by seeking an examination as 
authorized by section 50-6-204(d)(1).  Here, there is no dispute that Dr. Sullivan 
                                                 
4 See generally Cross v. Norrod Builders, Inc., No. M2005-00743-WC-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 855, 
at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Apr. 11, 2006) (In the context of a conflict between a physician and 
an adjuster that had been caused by the adjuster’s interference with the employee’s treatment and 
insistence that the employee be placed at maximum medical improvement, the Panel observed that “[t]he 
statute does not require repeated examinations be conducted because the employer is displeased with the 
results,” particularly when the employer or its agent caused those results.). 
 
5 Although an employer is responsible for composing the panel of physicians, the selection of the 
authorized physician ultimately rests with the employee.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i) (2015). 
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significantly undermined the impairment rating he gave, which was the only impairment 
rating for Employee’s vision, characterizing it as “skewed” because the underlying test 
results were “unreliable.” 
 
 The trial court also explained that Employer “seeks only another impairment 
rating.”  Assuming for the sake of analysis that such a rationale would be an insufficient 
basis to request an examination under section 50-6-204(d)(1), Employer’s position as 
reflected in its papers filed in the trial court and at the expedited hearing contradicts the 
trial court’s characterization of Employer’s request.  While acknowledging that Dr. 
Sullivan’s impairment rating of 34% was high, the crux of Employer’s position was that 
Dr. Sullivan’s opinion was “skewed because of the unreliable and inconsistent results of 
the peripheral vision testing.”  Employer made no argument that the rating was too high 
or too low, with Employer’s counsel observing: 
 
I don’t know what the rating should be.  All I know is that the basis of the 
rating that [Dr. Sullivan] has provided states that [it’s] based on unreliable 
tests and that the results are skewed.  At the end of the day, [Employee] 
may have exactly the same rating, but I believe it’s appropriate that we 
clarify that before we move forward. 
 
 In addition, Employer’s counsel took the position that “there is in controversy the 
basis for testing, the visual testing basis for the visual medical impairment rating when 
the doctor’s report states that it’s skewed and unreliable.  And that’s the basis for our 
request for an independent medical evaluation.”  Furthermore, Employer’s counsel 
asserted that “[i]f the doctor had . . . just made a 34 percent body-as-a-whole impairment 
rating here, we wouldn’t be having this discussion.”  Employer’s argument on appeal is 
consistent with these arguments made below, i.e., that Dr. Sullivan’s belief the 
impairment rating he provided was untrustworthy, coupled with Dr. Chung’s deferring to 
Dr. Sullivan to rate Employee’s visual system, results in an inability on the part of 
Employer to adequately evaluate Employee’s claim for permanent disability benefits.   
 
 In our view, the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that Employer’s 
request was reasonable.  If the visual testing results are unreliable, so is the rating, a point 
Dr. Sullivan clearly recognized.  The record contains nothing to the contrary.  
Consequently, Employer is entitled to the requested medical examination of Employee as 
authorized by section 50-6-204(d)(1).
6
 
                                                 
6
 We also note that Employer first attempted to obtain a reliable impairment rating by utilizing the MIRR 
Program, which would have permitted Employee to participate in choosing the physician to render the 
impairment rating.  Because the physician performing an evaluation within the confines of the MIRR 
Program is not hired by either party, Employer’s attempt to obtain an impairment rating in this manner 
supports its contention that it is seeking an accurate rating rather than merely a lower rating as Employee 
asserts. 
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Before concluding, we note that in denying Employer’s request, the trial court 
relied upon Long v. Tri-Con Industries, 996 S.W.2d 173 (Tenn. 1999).  In Long, the 
employer’s request for a medical examination, made because “the impairment rating 
assigned by [the treating physician] was ‘significantly higher than anticipated,’” was 
granted by the trial court but the court’s order specified which physician was to perform 
the examination.  Id. at 178-79.  The Supreme Court’s analysis of the issue focused on 
whether the trial court erred in specifying the physician to perform the examination, not 
whether granting the employer’s request for an examination was proper.  Thus, Long is 
not helpful in resolving the present case. 
 
The trial court also relied on Perry v. Gap, Inc., No. M2004-02525-WC-R3-CV, 
2006 Tenn. LEXIS 448 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel May 31, 2006), which is likewise 
distinguishable.  In Perry, the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel agreed 
with the trial court’s conclusion that the employer was not entitled to an examination 
because the employee had already been “seen by another of [the employer’s] doctors and 
[the court] will not require her to go to yet another doctor.”  Id. at *6.  However, in 
affirming the trial court’s denial, the Panel observed that the physicians involved in the 
care of the employee had provided testimony that was “sufficient to fulfill the statutory 
requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(1).”  Id. at *7-8.  Such is 
not the case here, as the only medical impairment rating in the record regarding 
Employee’s vision has been deemed unreliable by the very physician who provided that 
rating.  Accordingly, Employer’s request in the present case is “entirely reasonable.”  
Trent, 206 S.W.2d at 304.    
 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Employer’s request for a medical examination of Employee as authorized by 
section 50-6-204(d)(1).  Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is reversed and the case 
remanded. 
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